Direction-of-fit
Beliefs and desires and how the world and mind fit each other
The concept of direction-of-fit has been discussed by various philosophers throughout history, although it was not always referred to using that specific term.
One early discussion of direction-of-fit can be found in the work of Aristotle. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes between two types of mental states: beliefs and desires. He argues that beliefs are "about" the world, while desires are directed "toward" the world. This distinction can be seen as an early version of the mind-to-world and world-to-mind directions of fit.
In the modern era, the concept of direction-of-fit was first explicitly discussed by the philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe. In her 1957 essay "Intention," Anscombe distinguishes between two types of intentional action: actions that involve bringing the world into line with our mental states (mind-to-world direction-of-fit) and actions that involve bringing our mental states into line with the world (world-to-mind direction-of-fit).
The concept of direction-of-fit was further developed by other philosophers in the latter half of the 20th century, including John Searle and Michael Bratman. Searle argued that all intentional mental states have a mind-to-world direction-of-fit, while Bratman argued that intentions have a world-to-mind direction-of-fit.
More recently, the concept of direction-of-fit has been applied in various areas of philosophy, including ethics, epistemology, and the philosophy of action. It has been used to explore questions about the nature of intentionality, agency, and the relationship between mental states and the world.
World-to-mind and mind-to-world
In her 1957 essay "Intention," philosopher Elizabeth Anscombe uses the terms "world-to-mind" and "mind-to-world" to describe two different directions of fit between mental states and the world.
According to Anscombe, intentional actions involve both a desire and a belief. The desire is directed toward the world, while the belief is about the world. The direction of fit describes the relationship between these mental states and the world.
In the world-to-mind direction of fit, the world is "fitted" to the desire. This occurs when the agent seeks to bring the world into conformity with their desire. For example, if I desire a glass of water, the world-to-mind direction of fit involves bringing a glass of water to me.
In the mind-to-world direction of fit, the mental state is "fitted" to the world. This occurs when the agent seeks to bring their beliefs about the world into conformity with the world itself. For example, if I believe that there is a glass of water on the table, the mind-to-world direction of fit involves my belief "matching" the world.
Anscombe argues that intentional action involves both directions of fit, but the two directions are different in nature. The world-to-mind direction of fit involves a kind of "conformity" between the world and the agent's desires, while the mind-to-world direction of fit involves a kind of "verification" of the agent's beliefs about the world.
philosopher John Searle uses the term "mind-to-world" to describe the direction of fit of all intentional mental states. He argues that all intentional states have a mind-to-world direction of fit, because they involve a representational relationship between the mind and the world. In other words, intentional states are about the world and are directed toward the world in a way that aims to accurately represent or track features of the world.
In contrast, Searle uses the term "world-to-mind" to describe a different type of relationship between mental states and the world. Specifically, he uses this term to describe the way that sensory information enters the mind and is processed into mental representations. This involves a "fitting" of the world into the mind, rather than a "fitting" of the mind to the world.
Another philosopher who has used the terms "world-to-mind" and "mind-to-world" is Michael Bratman. Bratman uses these terms in the context of his theory of intention. According to Bratman, intentions have a world-to-mind direction of fit, because they involve a process of deliberation and planning that aims to bring the agent's mental states into conformity with the world. In other words, intentions involve a "fitting" of the mind to the world, as the agent plans and acts in accordance with their intentions.
Bibliography
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Book VI, Chapter 2.
Anscombe, G.E.M. "Intention." The Philosophical Review, vol. 66, no. 3, 1957, pp. 320-323.
Searle, John. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press, 1983.
Bratman, Michael. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, 1987